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Abstract
Constitutional law and Democracy are two domains 
that are inevitably in tension. Nevertheless, there have 
been theories and proposals to improve the necessary 
coexistence of both elements in modern constitutional 
democratic systems. Richard Albert’s work distinguishes 
between constitutional changes (amendments and dis-
memberments) and introduces a non-merely symbolic 
role to the people in terms of legitimacy, can be qualified 
as one of these theories. This paper focuses on the dem-
ocratic input that Albert proposes along with his book.
 
Keywords: constitutional amendments; constitutional 
dismemberments; democracy; constitutional moments; 
derivate constituent power. 
Resumo
O direito constitucional e a democracia são dois domínios 
que estão inevitavelmente em tensão. No entanto, tem 
havido teorias e propostas para melhorar a necessária 
coexistência de ambos os elementos nos sistemas demo-
cráticos constitucionais modernos. O trabalho de Richard 
Albert distingue entre mudanças constitucionais (emendas 
e desmembramentos) e introduz um papel não meramente 
simbólico para o povo em termos de legitimidade, podendo 
ser qualificado como uma dessas teorias. Este artigo enfoca 
a contribuição democrática que Albert propõe junto com 
seu livro.
Palavras-chave: emendas constitucionais; desmembra-
mentos constitucionais; democracia; momentos constitu-
cionais; poder constituinte derivado. 
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1. INEXORABLENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
One of the most ancient philosophical controversies that we are aware of is the 
one between Heraclitus and Parmenides on the being of nature (physis). Heraclitus con-
tended that everything flows and therefore, it is in a constant change, everything is 
dynamic and temporary.1 In constitutional terms, no constitution is permanent, and 
of course, no disposition is unamendable. Constitutions are continually flowing throu-
ghout a never-ending change. If we consider that constitutional amendments give 
form and path to this constant change, then we will support Richard’s claim, consti-
tutional amendments are an essential part of constitutions, not only procedurally but 
also materially.2
On the other hand, we can also conceive the opposite, constitutional amend-
ments are mostly irrelevant,3 because constitutional change is inexorable, and it would 
happen no matter what the constitutional provisions on the amendment may stipulate. 
In this case, the role of the amendment is limited, in the best-case scenario, to juridify 
changes that already occurred. The change produces the amendment rather than the 
other way around.4 
In front of Heraclitus, we find Parmenides who considered that nothing chan-
ges, and any change is always illusionary. Change is impossible and irrational. Reason 
(Logos) dictates what is real and what is not, and according to the famous quotation of 
Parmenides: “whatever is, is, and what is not cannot be”.5
It is remarkable that according to the monist interpretation of Parmenides, the 
only reason establishes the being. The same “reason” and rationalisation that involves 
law. Law, modern law, is exclusively rationality, reason, and its legitimacy lies solely in 
axioms of legal rationalism. In this sense, a possible interpretation of Parmenides words 
1  CONCHE, Marcel. The Fragments of the Work of Heraclitus of Ephesus On Nature. London: Creative 
Media Partners, 2018.
2  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019.
3  See STRAUSS, David. A. The irrelevance of constitutional amendments. Harvard Law Review, vol. 114, p. 
1457-1505, 2001.
4  STRAUSS, David. A. The irrelevance of constitutional amendments. Harvard Law Review, vol. 114, p. 1457-
1505, 2001.
5  GALLOP, David. Parmenides of Elea: Fragments, a Text and Translation. Toronto: Toronto University 
Press, 1984.
The inexorableness of constitutional amendments and its democratic potentiality
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 689-705, set./dez. 2020. 691
in our domain would be that only law, as pure reason determines what is real, meaning, 
that only codified (rationalised norms) can be qualified as amendment rules. 
It is not plausible to understand the process of amendment as aseptic and 
straightforward transplantation of social or political changes into the realm of law. The 
process of juridification considered as a defining element of the rule of law it is also 
an element to enforce rationalisation. Constitutional amendments (codified or not) im-
plies a process of (legal) rationalisation, and even considering an amendment as simply 
ratifying of changes that have already take place in society, the process of juridification 
has not only normative effects but also material ones. Therefore, it may also affect the 
change that causes the amendment process. 
As a matter of example of this ancient debate in constitutions, constitutional-
ism and amendments, we can questioning whether the Constitution of Egypt of 2014 
has changed the previous Constitution of 30 November 2012? Both constitutions are 
results of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary événements.6 Then an obvious pre-
sumption is to think that both constitutional drafts involved significant changes in po-
litical and constitutional terms. 
The Constitution of 2012 was passed by an Islamist party (Muslim Brotherhoods) 
that constitutionalised the main goals of the revolution (building up a democratic state, 
adherence to democratic principles, pluralism and multiparty system). However, the 
previous Constitution of 1971 in force under the Presidency of Hosni Mubarak already 
stated that Egypt was a democratic state (art.1), with a multiparty system (art.5). In 
addition, the current Constitution of 2014 recognises these principles, democratic Re-
public (art.1), with a political system based on political and partisan multiplicity (art.5). 
Perhaps due to a sort of constitutional “inertia” and despite the political measures that 
Mubarak, Morsi (potentially) and Sisi implemented, to eliminate these dispositions 
have a higher cost than to behave accordingly to them. 
The reading of article 2 (as amended in 1980) of all these constitutional char-
ters, the one related to the role of Islam and Sharia, a disposition exported by Egypt to 
the rest of the Arab world, can also enlighten the real change that these revolutions 
have caused in constitutional terms. Certainly, we can also define these dispositions as 
aspirational constitutionalism,7 or “programmatic” constitutional declarations because 
of its null incidence in the daily life of citizens, as Chapter 1 of the book analyses in the 
section “Text and Reality”.8 
6  RICOEUR, Paul. Événement et sens. Raisons practiques, vol. 2, p. 41-56, 1991.
7  SCHEPELLE, Kim Lane. Aspirational and Aversive constitutionalism: The case for studying cross-constitu-
tional influence through negative models. International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 1, n. 2, p. 296-
324, 2003.
8  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 51.
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The answer to these questions is related to a more essentialist analysis on consti-
tutions. Additionally, no constitution can stop a revolution, a military coup and another 
kind of political events, neither a constitutional amendment can. Richard acknowled-
ges this Realpolitik truism from a constitutional perspective by saying: “if the political will 
exists to alter an obdurate constitutional text, a new constitution can be written with the 
unamendable rule removed or loosened”.9 Not even a new constitutional text is essential, 
and: “where constitutional replacement is impossible….the authoritative interpreter may 
find a way to interpret a constitutional amendment”,10 or a constitutional disposition. This 
fact is even more flagrant because no constitutional system escapes of direct or indirect 
control of the executive branch and partycracy.11 
However, from a pragmatic perspective, despite whether we may consider 
amendments as irrelevant or the most critical section of our constitutions, constitu-
tional amendments are a normative and a material reality that cannot be detached 
of constitutional charters. From a Kantian pragmatic perspective or a strict positivis-
tic standpoint, there cannot be a constitution without “rules for changing the rules”.12 
There is no constitution without amendment rules. An objective fact that per se justi-
fies, Richard Albert’s insight in this magnificent book and reinforces the centrality that 
amendments have in comparative constitutional law.13
2. DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
A reader influenced by the Critical Legal Studies approaches the relation of law 
and Democracy with scepticism or even nihilism. Law implies rationalisation and so-
cial domination and consequently is not easy to fuse with democracies. The use of the 
euphemism “constitutional democracies” instead of mixed governments to define our 
“democratic” political systems is not improving the relation between the two elements 
of the paraphrase. 
However, the way that Albert links constitutional amendments and Democra-
cy is compelling and opens paths to develop popular participation in the realm of 
9  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 141.
10  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 141.
11  COTA, Maurizio. Partitocracy: Parties and their Critics in Italian Political Life. In: PASQUINO, Jones, E., (eds.). 
The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. p. 41-52.
12  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 3.
13  TUSHNET, Mark.  Peasants with Pitchforks, and Toilers with Twitter: Constitutional Revolutions and the Con-
stituent Power. International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 13, n. 3, p. 639-654, 2015.
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constitutionalism. Whether this is a romantic form,14 does not change its potentiality, 
especially in a society where digital technologies are applicable. However, there is also 
a question related to the essential nature of the amendment and its legitimacy; an epis-
temological question, that Richard responses excellently: “The right to amend a consti-
tution is above all a right to democratic choice. Amendment rules, then, shall be designed 
and used for a related reason: to promote democracy”.15 Albert continues quoting Ruben-
feld to remark that written constitutionalism requires a process of popular writing and 
re-writing.
I would add that not only written constitutionalism, also non-written constitu-
tionalism using non-codified means requires processes to enable the participation of 
the people in the amendment of the non-codified but constitutional norms. Nowadays 
only three state constitutional systems around the world are classified as “non-written” 
(United Kingdom, Israel and New Zealand) a disputed definition, because not codified 
in a single text, does not mean unwritten.16
Can a non-codified constitutional amendment serve formal, functional and 
symbolic uses in constitutionalism? In non-codified constitutionalism, amendments 
are also inexorable, and if the system is defined as democratic, it needs to involve the 
Demos in constitutional matters.
As Richard Albert has observed, the practice of unamendability plays a critical 
role in the relation between constitutional amendment and democracy (chapter 4 and 
p.271). As he notes, to limit the possibility of constitutional change is not a reasonable 
option in the modern world, and it would lack legitimacy of present popular consent.17 
Even that these limits to amend affect matters such as the bill of rights, peace (Japa-
nese Constitution), republican form (French Constitution) or human dignity (German 
Constitution).
Besides, I believe that the inclusion of these kinds of constitutional dispositions 
does not make sense because of the inexorability of the change (Heraclitus) and the 
fact that no constitutional disposition can prevent a revolution, some political changes 
or constitutional moments (Ackerman). Consider the political debate opened in Japan, 
where Prime Minister Shinzo Abe attempted to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Consti-
tution. With this article, Japan renounces war as a sovereign right and the threat of use 
of force as a mean of settling international disputes and prohibits the maintenance of 
14  STRAUSS, David. A. The irrelevance of constitutional amendments. Harvard Law Review, vol. 114, p. 1457-
1505, 2001.
15  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 46.
16  GREY, Thomas. C. Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary 
Thought. Stanford Law Review, vol. 30, n. 5, p. 843-893, 1978.
17  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 271.
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land, sea and air forces. Some authors consider the Prime’s Minister proposal and the 
use of a specific referendum on the topic, as a constitutional coup;18 others an uncons-
titutional constitutional amendment.19 
On the other hand, some authors argue that article 9 contradicts Japan’s place in 
the contemporary world and the factual reality. Despite the strong symbolic character 
of the article and its conceptualisation as a Japanese (imposed) constitutional value of 
peace, Japan has the fourth largest military in the world. Therefore, we find again here 
a question of text and reality and assertive and aspirational principles.
A second example on the inexorability of change and the relative transcenden-
ce of constitutional dispositions and amendments in front of some political events is 
the null constitutional changes that the independence of Algeria caused in the French 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958. The process of independence of the French 
dépaterments in Algeria caused constitutional crises the ended with the Fourth Repu-
blic and the Constitution of 1946. A constitutional text that for the first time in French 
history consecrated the complete equality of rights between the citizens of metropoli-
tan France and those of overseas.
However, the independence occurred in 1962, four years later, the enactment 
of the current constitution, and not constitutional amendment happened in the text. 
Alternatively, as Diemert explains, from the entry into force of the Constitution of 4 
October 1958 until the mid-1970s, the overseas territories were progressively margi-
nalised and normalised on the constitutional level, the secession of Algeria takes place 
in a legal context marked by the almost complete absence of constitutional review.20
3. UNAMENDABILITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE
Richard Albert is bright on the democratic inconvenient that non-amendable 
provisions cause. The conclusion of the book is an example of the significance that this 
aspect has for the author. In the introduction of Chapter 4, after explaining the Zelaya’s 
affair in Honduras, he concludes stating: “But should Hondurans have been denied the 
right to speak their views on an issue so central to their political life? It is, after all, their 
constitution, and they are the ones who must live it with it”.21 This thoughtful statement re-
18  ACKERMAN, Bruce; MATSUDAIRA, Tokujin. Dishonest Abe. Foreign Policy, 24 June 2014. Available at: 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/24/dishonest-abe/>.
19  ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
20  DIEMERT, Stephane. L’histoire constitutionnelle de l’outre-mer sous la Ve République. Nouveaux Cahiers 
du Conseil Constitutionnel, Paris, n. 35,  Dossier: La Constitution et l´Outre-Mer, avr. 2012. Available at: 
<https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/nouveaux-cahiers-du-conseil-constitutionnel/l-histoire-constitution-
nelle-de-l-outre-mer-sous-la-ve-republique>.
21  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 140.
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flects the issues that unamendability also inflects to the fundamental rights of political 
participation and freedom of speech. 
Besides the good reasons that Albert remarks, there are additional problems 
of unamendable constitutional dispositions from a democratic perspective. Such as 
who decides what is unamendable, when it does so, and what for. The answers to these 
questions, in constitutional democracies, must be democratically legitimate. 
Following the three varieties of unamendability (codified, interpretative and 
constructive), the one who decides, who is acting as a sovereign (Theorie des Dezisionis-
mus) in the first case, is an elected body with the exceptions of illiberal democracies and 
imposed governments. In the second category (interpretative unamendability), the de-
cision is taken by an unelected body, the judiciary (with some exceptions of legislature 
possessing powers of binding constitutional interpretation). Within this category, mi-
xed bodies exercising the control of constitutionality, such as the Conseil Constitution-
nel (France, Lebanon, Cameroun) may be included. In the third case (constructive), the 
decision-makers are political actors also selected democratically. 
All classification involves elements of subjectivity, this one presented by Richard 
Albert includes a hybrid category (constructive unamendability) that can also be de-
fined as deconstructive in a Derridian sense, a codified procedure of amendment, the 
decision can be taken by both, elected and unelected bodies.
Even that the dominant view,22 considers that judicial invalidation of constitu-
tional amendments rests on democratic foundations, the tensions with the principle 
of Democracy are obvious since the landmark case Marbury v. Madison , as Jefferson 
already pointed out and has given rise to much debate and caused rivers of ink to flow. 
Richard Albert starts his account on this topic by summarising Yaniv Roznai’s 
“contractual” theory, where the “people authorises” the constituted powers, to act in 
her name. It follows by remarking that according to another understanding of consti-
tutional change, the doctrine of unconstitutional amendment denies democratic choi-
ce to reformers and the people.23 Then, Albert takes a kind of Pontius Pilate’s position: 
“whether democracy demands the doctrine of unconstitutional amendment depends on 
one’s view of what democracy requires”.24 Certainly, “democracy” is a concept that has had 
multiple meanings throughout history. Today it is still a vague concept. Democracy can 
be understood as a principle, as a political orientation of those who favour government 
by the people. Democracy appears to mean popular, political self-government - the 
22  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 217.
23  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 221.
24  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 271.
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people of a country deciding for themselves the contents (especially, one would think, 
the most fateful and fundamental contents) of the laws that organise and regulate their 
political association.  
There is a common observation that constitutionalism and Democracy are ine-
vitably in tension. Democracy seems to require that the current policy judgements of 
today’s majority be implemented, while constitutionalism seems to require that some 
such judgements be thwarted. Constitutionalism appears to mean the containment of 
popular political decision making by a basic law, the constitution.
If there is no a link between the people and the constitution the relations beco-
me antithetical because the elite deciding in the name of the people becomes a sort of 
modern oligarchy which consolidates an institutional structure mirroring the socioeco-
nomic classes. Demos and Democracy will be the poor class and constitutionalism and 
the decider will be represent the economic and politic elites. The antithetical character 
of these concepts does not exclude the possibility of mediation between them, and this 
is where constitutional amendments as conceived by Richard Albert in the book shall 
play an important role. 
4. RECONCILIATION
Chapter 4 includes “reconciliation” among the different uses of codified una-
mendability. This kind of non-amendable constitutional provisions aim to end a conflict 
between previously conflicting groups. Richard Albert follows by stating: “unamendabi-
lity as reconciliation makes peace possible between enemies conferring irrevocable amnes-
ty for prior conduct…..The new constitutions of Niger and Ghana granted eternal immunity 
to the architects, enablers, and executors of these destructive episodes in the life of each 
country”.25
If this is a normative claim, we need to observe other transitions to Democracy 
from regimes of horror to have the complete picture. For example, the effects of the 
lack of transitional justice in Spain causes that after 40 years of the death of the dicta-
tor, more than 140.000 persons are disappeared in mass graves without exhumation, 
trial, reparation or justice.  Despite Ghana struck an agreement to create an innovative 
ceasefire constitution, the constitutionalisation of this kind of amnesty laws and “recon-
ciliation acts” is undemocratic and in some cases breaches international humanitarian 
law. The unamendable form of these dispositions deters any transitional justice or repa-
ration from the superior legal norm of the country.
Legislators are well-aware that this amnesty dispositions breach the principle 
of universal jurisdiction, the enforcement of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations and 
25  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 143.
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prevent the prosecution of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture. 
In this sense, the Rome statute (signed and ratified by Ghana) grants the international 
foundation that strengthens the domestic enactment of acts and the engagement of 
the judiciary to handle cases that offend humanity in general irrespective of their loca-
tion or residence. 
Therefore, there is not only a democratic requirement of unamendability; the-
re are also human rights and human dignity requirements to be fulfilled.26 In Ghana, 
the constitutional unamendability has caused a legal loophole making the country po-
tential safe havens for fugitives suspected of war crime and crimes against humanity 
(Amnesty International). Ghana, as in Spain, can face a legal paradox, genocide can be 
prosecuted except if it was committed by a Ghanaian. 
The book proposes alternatives to codified unamendability consisting in “offer 
its expressive benefits without democratic burdens….codifying an escalating structure of 
restricted amendment pathways to make some constitutional rules harder to amend than 
others yet without insulating any of them from formal change”.27 This escalating struc-
ture may incorporate several degrees of amendment difficulty designating different 
thresholds (the highest threshold applied to the essential features of the constitution) 
and including the participation (in composed or federal states) of the subnational legis-
latures. As Richard Albert states, this escalate structure offers the benefits of unamen-
dability while no extinguishing the power of amendment.28 
Albert’s proposal is coherent with the democratic principle because the organs 
in charge to decide on the amendability of a constitutional disposition are representa-
tives elected by the people. However, if the constitutional control stills been attributed 
to the judiciary, a non-elected body will continue to have the power of decision on the 
formal and material elements of the norm (including its amendability). 
The escalating structure erases the symbolism and political connotations that 
the status of unamendability involves. Legislators defining as “unamendable” a consti-
tutional principle or disposition aim to determinate a concrete political and legal beha-
viour of citizens and public officers. In some of the cases, constitutional unamendability 
is the first stone of political culture and constitutional identity principle. Take the prin-
ciple of human dignity in Germany as an example of this. The state needs the coercion 
that the declaration of unanmendability implies to impose concrete social and political 
26  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 198-202.
27  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 201.
28  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 202.
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behaviour. It is a crude act of sovereignty, dominion and legal rationalisation of the real 
constituent power and not the figurative one. 
With his proposal I wonder whether Richard Albert accepts a sort of constructive 
unamendability for the essentials features of the constitution, “a constitutional norm is 
constructively unamendable when the codified threshold required to amend it are so one-
rous that reformers cannot realistically satisfy the standard ….. requiring reformers to per-
form impossible heroics to successful amend the constitution”.29
Do democratic constitutional systems necessarily need non-amendable disposi-
tions to protect their meta-constitutional values, principles and identity? If Albert be-
lieves so, no escalating structure is required. If the unamendability is to protect the 
essential requirements for a democratic state (as in the case of the Czech Republic), 
we are in front of a democratic paradox, if there is a democratic agreement on these 
essential requirements. 
5. CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS, EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL AND 
POPULAR AMENDMENTS
The introduction of the book defines the theory of Constitutional Moments of 
Bruce Ackerman comparing it with the basic structure doctrine of the Indian Supreme 
Court. Richard Albert considers that these theories resemble, both have altered how 
the constitution is changed, and when we recognise a change as valid. He contends 
correctly that: “a constitutional moment is not just any profound transformation in cons-
titutional meaning… it is a precedential change to formal amendment rules without a for-
mal amendment. At bottom, a constitutional moment is a successful reconfiguration of the 
process and political consensus required to legitimate a constitutional change”. Albert then 
remarks the powerful implication that the theory has retelling that codified rules of change 
can themselves de changed without a corresponding recodification”.30
The theory of constitutional moments deserves more attention when talking 
about constitutional amendments. Despite I believe that the name “constitutional mo-
ments” is not accurate, because Ackerman defines these “moments” as processes that 
happen progressively and not in a concrete instant. 
As described by Ackerman, constitutional moments occur very rarely (only three 
times in the history of the U.S), at times when “We the People” speak using extraconsti-
tutional means to make fundamental changes in the constitution. The fact that they are 
“extraconstitutional” and “popular” at origin is also remarkable and transcendent to the 
29  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 158-159.
30  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 22.
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relations of constitutional amendments and Democracy. The relevance is evident be-
cause the initiator of the constitutional change is the people themselves, and it shows, 
that there are extraconstitutional ways to amend the constitution; without the need to 
follow the legal processual formalities and even the material limitation.
Constitutional moments are characterised by the fact that an unusually high 
number of citizens are convinced of the seriousness of the matter under discussion (far 
greater than in the case of decisions to be taken in normal times), by the fact that all 
citizens have the opportunity to express their views on the question, and finally by the 
fact that a majority supports a specific way of solving the question.31
Richard Albert’s explanation of these particular moments lacks an important 
element, the epistemological relation that the constitutional moments have with the 
normal politics. Ackerman defines both concepts in a dialogical way; we cannot con-
ceive a constitutional moment without normal politics. As we cannot understand the 
definition of constitutional dismemberment deprived of constitutional amendments. 
The distinction between normal and constitutional moments turns out to be mapped 
onto each other.
In normal politics, we include the everyday decisions taken by the government; 
there is no debate or popular mobilisation. The electorate entrusts the management 
of legal matters to the government, and the government, legitimated by this manda-
te, takes the decisions that it believes most appropriate. In normal politics, a “united” 
population allows democratically. Normal moments are managed by elected represen-
tatives, while constitutional moments are managed by the people; normal politics are 
not particularly reflective, whereas constitutional politics are; normal politics involve 
the pluralist pursuit of group interests, while constitutional politics involve principles 
and the common good. 32
A constitutional moment also plays a role in altering the framework in which 
normal politics develop: That is, constitutional moments not only differ from the pe-
riods of normality that precede and follow them but must also ensure that the two 
phases of normal politics, before and afterwards, are different. Even that constitutional 
moments are infrequent, occurring only at key political moments; they have long-las-
ting constitutional effects (even though the constitutional moment is only temporary) 
and, most importantly for the present paper, the citizens who aim to effect a constitu-
tional transformation act directly.
For Ackerman, we should treat normal moments—that is, the situation in which 
the people decide to withdraw from politics—with the greatest respect. The people de-
legate power to their representatives, who may be substituted through the appropriate 
31  See ACKERMAN, Bruce. We the people Foundations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
32  HERZOG, Donald J. Democratic Credentials. Ethics, vol. 104, n. 3, p. 467-479, 1994.
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democratic procedures. Therefore, normal politics is as important as constitutional po-
litics for the stability and necessary continuity that every legal system needs. As noted 
above, the purpose of the constitutional moment is to affect a specific normal moment 
in a direct way and to produce a different new normal moment.
The theory and experience of constitutional and normal moments should 
be studied when proposing a constitutional amendment theory, which stimulates a 
democratic role in the process of constitutional change. Since in this theory, citizens 
have direct access to the promulgation of the fundamental laws of their state, without 
intermediaries.
However, the study of how “the people” act directly in constitutional amend-
ments should be adapted within the types of amendments categorised in the book. 
This differentiation will help us to understand that the dialogue among citizens will 
vary according to the type of amendment, the political context, time and society.
6. THE PEOPLE AND THE LIMITS OF THE POUVOIR CONSTITUANT 
DÉRIVÉ IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND 
DISMEMBERMENTS
One of the most important contributions of Richard Albert’s book to constitutio-
nal doctrine is his distinction between constitutional amendments and constitutional 
dismemberments. The difference is structured in four techniques, procedural, narrow 
textual approach (positivist) and consent-based approach. The notion of dismember-
ment is a precious doctrinal response to a phenomenon that had not a theoretical au-
tonomous accommodation, but it happened the de facto. 
A constitutional change targeting the essential characteristics of the constitu-
tion, the constitutional identity principles, or to destroy the constitutional foundation 
cannot be considered as a simple amendment. The distinction provides a theoretical 
response to a phenomenon that differs from constitutional changes because it affects 
the fundamental ontology of the constitution, its Being.33 
The chapter grounds the distinction of amendment and dismemberment from 
Carl Schmitt’s theory of constitutional change, and the difference between pouvoir 
constituant (constituent power) and pouvoir constitué (constituted power) of Joseph 
Sieyès. Albert follows Sieyès’ hierarchical division of labour between the people, as prin-
cipals, and their agent representatives in government. The superior group is the consti-
tuent power referring to the body of “people” (as constitutional fictional construction) 
in whom supreme power resides. The inferior group is the constituted power as the 
33  HEIDEGGER, Martin. Sein und Zeit. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015.
The inexorableness of constitutional amendments and its democratic potentiality
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 689-705, set./dez. 2020. 701
institutions a constitution creates or regulates to carry out the duties and discretionary 
authority delegated by the people.34 
The distinction between amendments and dismemberments is democratically 
relevant due to its theoretical relation with the constituent power, which has been de-
fined as the truth of modern Democracy35 or the juristic expression of the democratic 
impetus.36
Can we consider democratically legitimate a constitutional amendment? What 
about a constitutional dismemberment? Richard Albert answers these questions (not 
explicitly) a contrario sensu by stating: “no constitution can properly be formed by a cons-
tituted power; it must be created- and understood to have been created – by the exercise of 
constituent power, which is to say by the people themselves.”37 
Therefore, theoretically no constitution can be dismantle, destroyed (that is 
dismembered) by a constituted power, only the exercise of constituent power, by the 
people themselves, can do so. This interpretation follows the words of the Declaration 
of Independence of the U.S.: “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new govern-
ment” but on the Federal Constitution. This is an excellent point that forces a democratic 
role in constitutional control. A role that can be exercised directly through referenda, 
popular consultations or constitutional crowdsourcing. 
Richard’s theoretical explanation does not mention the classical distinction wi-
thin the constituent power (pouvoir constituant originaire and pouvoir constituant deri-
vé) that it has been used in order to “democratically legitimise” the role of constitutio-
nal/supreme courts as exclusive guardians of the constitution. The “original constituent 
power” does not derive its legitimacy from a pre-existing legal norm; it is in terms of 
Kelsen, the power that creates the basic norm without legal constrains.38 The “derived 
constituent power” is related to the amendment of the constitution, it must respect the 
procedure, and material constraints imposed by the constitution. Nevertheless, it stills 
been a constituent power, and therefore it can legitimately dismember the constitution. 
These theories need to be updated to the new technological era, where e-de-
mocracy offers a new range of possibilities to implement and improve direct Democra-
cy in the realm of the constituent power. We have observed (Iceland, Chile, Colombia, 
34  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 72.
35  KALYVAS, Andreas. Constituent Power. In: BERSTEIN, Jay M.; OPHIR, Adi; STOLER, Ann Laura (eds.). Political 
Concepts, a Critical Lexicon. New York: Fordham University Press. Available at: <https://www.politicalcon-
cepts.org/constituentpower/>.
36  See LOUGHLIN, Martin. The Idea of Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
37  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Changing and Breaking Constitutions. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2019. p. 72.
38  KELSEN, Hans. The Pure Theory of Law. Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, 2015.
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Catalonia, Ireland) the first experiences of people acting in the original constituent 
power directly. These experiences have overcame the limits and constraints of an im-
posed fiction supported by several theories that excluded the people as effective sove-
reign. From the “contractualism” (from Rousseau to Bell, Gaus), “consensual acceptance” 
(From Hume to Barnett), to the ‘rule of recognition’ (Hart, Green, Raz, Kutz). The truth 
modern democracy may now end with the invisibility of the people and fulfil the eter-
nal promise of the modern constituent power, to make the people as-the-governed 
active participants in the shaping and ruling of political systems, and constitutional 
charters.39
Whether the concept of constituent power is a sociological concept, neither 
moral nor legal it is contested. However, Loughlin locates the constituent power on 
the boundaries of legal knowledge, whose meaning is bound up with deeper disputes 
concerning the nature of legal, political and constitutional ordering.40 Kalyvas and Noo-
tens define the concept as political, due to its conceptual articulation with the concept 
of Democracy.41 Arato links the concept with other political notions (social contract, 
sovereignty, the people as a whole and the separation of powers).42
The debate on the nature of the constituent power is not merely theoretical. The 
point to establish a normative and not sociological concept is to legitimate legal chan-
ge that cannot be legitimated with reference to existing legal norms. If the concept 
of constituent power is normative and justificatory, a constitutional dismemberment 
will be legitimate if it follows the legal processes (positivist approach). On the other 
hand, if it is sociological, the legitimation can be alegal, in a constitutional democracy, 
democratically. 
7. CONCLUSION
Solon, a founder of Athenian Democracy, was an statesman, poet and legislator 
that governed Athens in a period of enormous social conflicts. The Solonian Constitu-
tion (politeia) introduced several measures to growth popular sovereignty, such as the 
cancellation of mortgages and indebtedness of the landholders’ citizens; all debt-slaves 
39  NOOTENS, Geneviève. Constituent power and people-as-the-governed: About the ‘invisible’ people of po-
litical and legal theory. Global Constitutionalism, vol. 4, n. 2, p. 137-156, 2015.
40  LOUGHLIN, Martin. The Idea of Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
41  See KALYVAS, Andreas. Constituent Power. In: BERSTEIN, Jay M.; OPHIR, Adi; STOLER, Ann Laura (eds.). Po-
litical Concepts, a Critical Lexicon. New York: Fordham University Press. Available at: <https://www.politi-
calconcepts.org/constituentpower/>; NOOTENS, Geneviève. Constituent power and people-as-the-governed: 
About the ‘invisible’ people of political and legal theory. Global Constitutionalism, vol. 4, n. 2, p. 137-156, 
2015.
42  ARATO, Andrew. The Adventures of the Constituent Power, beyond Revolutions? Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017.
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were freed, he confirmed of the Ekklesia as source of all legislative, executive and judi-
cial power, and opened the membership of the law courts to all.43 
After ruling and reforming Athens, Solon travelled abroad for ten years, in a self-
-imposed exile visiting Egypt, Cyprus and Lydia. When he returned to Athens, he found 
a very different political situation; he could not recognise his city because of the politi-
cal changes and upheavals that occurred. Some of the democratic measures that Solon 
introduced in the constitution were amended by the Jurors, taking advantage of the 
constitutional flexibility and the vague language of Athenian statues.44 The Athenian 
Constitution was an unentrenched written constitution because the body of standing 
laws could be amended at any time.
Despite Richard Albert states that it is a modern practice, political and cons-
titutional amendments are old as constitutions (codified and uncodified) and politi-
cal systems. Amendments and changes are intrinsic and unavoidable features of law. 
Law and constitutions are living documents and codified rules of change and formal 
amendments are guarantees and safeguards of legal certainty and the rule of law. Al-
bert with this book, as he aimed, brings formal amendment back to centre of the field 
of constitutional change. 
Multiple elements of his work are going to condition the constitutional analysis 
on constitutional amendments. His distinction between amendments and dismember-
ment fills a doctrinal loophole, which exists because of the widespread use of a concept 
(constitutional amendment). As Richard Albert claims the phenomenon of dismember-
ment has a different essence and transcendence, it is not a “mere” constitutional mu-
tation but a make or a break that deserves an autonomous concept. In this sense, the 
cases of Making and Breaking of the title of the book may be dismemberments. 
Albert’s book is a comparative constitutional law tour de force, which deals 
mainly with constitutional change and control, but not only. Throughout this epistemo-
logical distinction, Richard convincingly opens the door to an approach of two domains 
(constitutionalism and Democracy) that are inevitably in tension. His proposal provides 
visibility to the people in the domain of constitutional change and helps to overcome 
an ancient scepticism on law, Democracy and a possible symbiotic coexistence. 
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